A Logical Fallacy From Sabermetrics

[Pete Rose Rounding Third]

(I hope I'm placing this in the right forum)

Now, I trust sabermetrics to a far greater extent than I trust the "traditional" approach. But one statement I've seen many times from the sabermetrics crowd just rankles me - and it's about clutch moments (I paraphrase):

"The idea that a major leaguer feels pressure is absurd. These players have already shown that they can cope with the pressure of making the major leagues, so there's no reason to think they can't cope with any situation on a baseball field."

Logically then, it must follow that literally all situations in baseball are the same. A first-inning AB in a Grapefruit League split-squad game is no different from a two-out AB against Mariano Rivera in game seven of the World Series. After all, these players have already shown that they are capable of playing Major League baseball, so why is it any different? Why should that batter feel any different about the WS game?

I sympathize with this view to the extent that a hitter should treat the AB like any other, but how is a human being, even a phenomenally gifted human being, supposed to ignore the gravity of the latter situation? The idea that players don't feel the finality, the pressure of "If I make an out, the season is over" simply because they are on a ML roster...I can't believe that. Sure, broadcasters overstate clutch and all that, but it is at least an equivalent overstatement to say that pressure ceases to exist once a player makes the major leagues.

Besides, think of the absurdity of saying all MLB players are alike in one very crucial way! They may differ in height, weight, build, speed, strength, ethnic and socio-economic background, hair color, eye color, batting stance...but they all cope with pressure exactly the same way. Player A hits for a high average but doesn't walk much and plays defense well; Player B is a low average power hitter who takes a lot of walks but can only DH. How is it players can have different strengths and weaknesses in other areas, but not this one?

Think of super wealthy people. Nine billionaires are all rich compared to you and me, but when they get together, one of them has the most money and one has the least. Comparatively, there is a "poor" member of that group. It's the same in baseball. Maybe it's true that MLers cope better with pressure than the population at large, but among themselves there are players who are incredibly mentally tough in clutch situations and players who have a hard time coping. Again, relative to their fellow major leaguers.

"Clutch" is overblown, but it exists. And I do believe some players handle clutch moments better than others.

[spark240]

"The idea that a major leaguer feels pressure is absurd. These players have already shown that they can cope with the pressure of making the major leagues, so there's no reason to think they can't cope with any situation on a baseball field."

Who says this again?

[SABR Matt]

As far as I can tell...no serious sabermetrician argues the clutch debate in this manner. Or at least...none have in quite some time.

[brett]

(I hope I'm placing this in the right forum)

Now, I trust sabermetrics to a far greater extent than I trust the "traditional" approach. But one statement I've seen many times from the sabermetrics crowd just rankles me - and it's about clutch moments (I paraphrase):

"The idea that a major leaguer feels pressure is absurd. These players have already shown that they can cope with the pressure of making the major leagues, so there's no reason to think they can't cope with any situation on a baseball field."

Logically then, it must follow that literally all situations in baseball are the same. A first-inning AB in a Grapefruit League split-squad game is no different from a two-out AB against Mariano Rivera in game seven of the World Series. After all, these players have already shown that they are capable of playing Major League baseball, so why is it any different? Why should that batter feel any different about the WS game?

I sympathize with this view to the extent that a hitter should treat the AB like any other, but how is a human being, even a phenomenally gifted human being, supposed to ignore the gravity of the latter situation? The idea that players don't feel the finality, the pressure of "If I make an out, the season is over" simply because they are on a ML roster...I can't believe that. Sure, broadcasters overstate clutch and all that, but it is at least an equivalent overstatement to say that pressure ceases to exist once a player makes the major leagues.

Besides, think of the absurdity of saying all MLB players are alike in one very crucial way! They may differ in height, weight, build, speed, strength, ethnic and socio-economic background, hair color, eye color, batting stance...but they all cope with pressure exactly the same way. Player A hits for a high average but doesn't walk much and plays defense well; Player B is a low average power hitter who takes a lot of walks but can only DH. How is it players can have different strengths and weaknesses in other areas, but not this one?

Think of super wealthy people. Nine billionaires are all rich compared to you and me, but when they get together, one of them has the most money and one has the least. Comparatively, there is a "poor" member of that group. It's the same in baseball. Maybe it's true that MLers cope better with pressure than the population at large, but among themselves there are players who are incredibly mentally tough in clutch situations and players who have a hard time coping. Again, relative to their fellow major leaguers.

"Clutch" is overblown, but it exists. And I do believe some players handle clutch moments better than others.

I studied sports psychology in graduate school, and pressure was an issue among all athletes of all levels.

The word for pressure is "arousal" and there is a whole branch of "performance psychology" dedicated to the arousal-performance relationship.

The problem is that some pressure actually tends to improve performance (it depends on the skill level of the athlete and the complexity of the task, but honestly hitting and pitching are NOT complex tasks especially for someone highly skilled). For a highschool kid to give an impromptu speech in front of the student body IS a complex task. And it depends on whether the environment has changed. I taught highschool and spoke without notes close to 10,000 times in 12 years, and after a year I never really got nervous, but if the principal decided to sit in one day, things changed, or on the other hand, if I called in to a radio talk show (once or twice) I totally lost my train of thought and got real nervous. It also depends somewhat on personality type.

At very high pressure levels performance drops, and it takes LESS of an increase in the usual pressure for complex tasks.

For MLB players, first, they ARE already at a high level of pressure and second hitting a baseball is almost pure reactive. I'm a little suprised there are not more baserunning or throwing blunders in the playoffs. I'd be interested first to see if errors go up in the post season. I'd honestly expect more players to "fall down walking up to the plate" in the WS than to react differently when actually hitting.

But everyone IS different when it comes to how different the situation has to be, and how complex the task has to be to cause a drop in performance. Many hitters should actually do a little better with a little more pressure.

A guy struggling to get his swing right is probably over-complexifying the task and is more likely to drop off.

I do believe that players go through stretches where they can shut off the externals. George Brett described that during much of '80 during a stretch where he hit over .470 for around 75 days. He also posted to my knowledge the highest BA with runners in scoring position ever (I think .469 for the season).

The whole key is to make the action "automatic". Then no stress level is going to be detrimental because the "complexity" drops to virtually insignificant.

I've known powerlifters who set personal records on days when they are actually mentally tired, and they don't remember performing the lift. They unrack the weight and then they are putting it back.

Overall, I think it is a wash between pitchers and hitters but I'd expect a fielding and maybe baserunning effect. I think batters might get less patient and pitchers might throw more fastballs more in the strike zone.

Do some hitters respond better? (and by the way, I don't think that guys IMPROVE, they just don't suffer as much as others-the hitter is less phased by the pitcher etc.)

What is the typical BA with RISP? in the 8th or 9th? of a 1 run game? Sample size disappears quickly.

The other thing is that what about the hitter who does better in the first 3 innings? What it that is actually just as valuable?

I decided to look at Brett's "leverage" ratings.

Brett was a 111 relative OPS+ in high leverage situations, 96 in medium and 99 in low. That would appear to be significant. The 111 for well over 2000 plate appearances is the highest I've seen. And leverage is something that should be perceived by the average hitter. And by the way, What does it mean for Brett? It could raise his contributional value by 2-2.5% or to that of a leverage neutral 138 OPS+ and that is meaningful.


Pick 10 "clutch" and 10 "non-clutch" hitters and pitchers and see if it holds up.

[Tango Tiger]

Talk about taking something one person said, ascribing it to "sabermetrics", and then railing against it.

How about this: "A Logical Fallacy From The Internet"

And let me find some moronic thing someone said, and then rail against the entire internet.

[leewileyfan]

Tossing all the math aside, while emphatically NOT dismissing sabermetrics, clutch should be a skill measurably had by some and not by others.

The argument that MLB players, having graduated through all the preliminary ranks of pressure, have reached a state of immunity fails altogether to recognize the human element. The MLB player may have passed many tests at lower levels; but so have his peers, including the nine on the opposing team in the field, dedicated to getting him out.

For example, some might argue statistically that Derek Jeter "choked" last night, striking out on a bunt attempt that had Tim McCarver stunned and disbelieving Jeter's involvement in such an awful strategy. From the human standpoint, Girardi, having total faith in Jeter's consistent ability to execute, probably gave the sign and Jeter tried to execute on a bad pitch for bunting: high, fast and outside.

In any event, someone doing a study on "clutch" would be justified in putting that play in the "choke" column.

How can I possibly believe that clutch is a skill?

1. Clutch generally suggests that someone is on base and that the pitcher, catcher and defense are somewhat distracted by the presence;

2. Clutch presupposes elevated drama, thus narrow sample sizes, sometimes further distilled in perhaps overly-shrunken models that block out the psychology of "clutch" as a batter attitude:

a. the pitcher distraction and probable loss of windup;
b. the need in close and tight situations to throw strikes;
c. the batter mindset that feeds on flashing hormones that tell him, "This guy [the pitcher] is in a jam; and everything is in my favor;"
................... as opposed to:

d. the hitter who seems the drama and not the opportunity, whose hormones tell him, "Man, this is on me and I'd better deliver."

.....and then all the guys in the range in between.

If the model allows more situations to qualify as clutch, findings might be more revealing than highly restrictive studies.

[ipitch]

For example, some might argue statistically that Derek Jeter "choked" last night, striking out on a bunt attempt that had Tim McCarver stunned and disbelieving Jeter's involvement in such an awful strategy. From the human standpoint, Girardi, having total faith in Jeter's consistent ability to execute, probably gave the sign and Jeter tried to execute on a bad pitch for bunting: high, fast and outside.

In any event, someone doing a study on "clutch" would be justified in putting that play in the "choke" column.

FWIW, Girardi said he did not tell Jeter to bunt with 2 strikes. Jeter did it on his own.

[SamtheBravesFan]

PRRT,

Only morons think that professional athletes don't feel any pressure. The statement you ascribe to sabrmetricians is probably from the infancy of the movement.

[leewileyfan]

FWIW, Girardi said he did not tell Jeter to bunt with 2 strikes. Jeter did it on his own.

Thanks for pointing that out. I almost made direct reference to that possibility in my post; but I let it got by including the word "probably:"

From the human standpoint, Girardi, having total faith in Jeter's consistent ability to execute, probably gave the sign and Jeter tried to execute on a bad pitch for bunting: high, fast and outside.

It doesn't surprise me that Jeter did that on his own seeing how surprising it might have turned out ... no play on him and everyone safe all-around.

Even at that, although the strategy failed [and badly], the play might have been recorded by some as a choke - but the attitude that made the decision was clutch that failed. Confidence, bordering on arrogance in the situation, shortened up on that bat.

[brett]

I'll add that we've all seen guys miss clutch free-throws. That's about as simple a task as it gets.

I think that what I have tended to hear in sabermetrics is that clutch does not tend to be repeatable and to a level that effects a team over a long time-period.

Tom, for the BBreference leverage numbers, did you actually use OPS+ splits, or linear weights splits? It implies OPS+.

Aren't George Brett's splits meaningful over a long career?

[Tango Tiger]

Tom, for the BBreference leverage numbers, did you actually use OPS+ splits, or linear weights splits? It implies OPS+.

?? Leverage Index is used to split the categories. LI of 1.5 or more is "high" and under 0.7 is "low". Otherwise, I don't understand the question.


Aren't George Brett's splits meaningful over a long career?

All data is meaningful. But, if your question is if the split is so meaningul that the split itself can be used without any regression, then the answer is 100% no. All observations are a combination of something real (clutch skill in this case) and random variation.

[brett]

?? Leverage Index is used to split the categories. LI of 1.5 or more is "high" and under 0.7 is "low". Otherwise, I don't understand the question.



All data is meaningful. But, if your question is if the split is so meaningul that the split itself can be used without any regression, then the answer is 100% no. All observations are a combination of something real (clutch skill in this case) and random variation.


For example, BBref lists Brett as 111 high leverage, 96 medium and 99 low.

Are these self relative OPS+ splits as they imply or something other than OPS+?

I take it to mean that if Brett has an overall 135 OPS+, it is 135*1.11 or 150 in high leverage situations, 135 x .96 or about 130 in medium and 135 x .99 or about 134 in low leverage.

Also is this relative to his overall OPS+ of 135, or does it also factor in how the league varies in different situations?

[SABR Matt]

It's self-relative only. It does not account for league performance.

[Beady]

If the model allows more situations to qualify as clutch, findings might be more revealing than highly restrictive studies.

I suspect it varies greatly from one individual to another, depending on the practicalities of the situation a man is in.

A Brett or a Jeter has considerable security, but for most players baseball is a profession with very little job security and a short career expectancy, where the only certainty is that they will be tested constantly, practically every day. A player's spot on the roster may be endangered, his position as a regular may be in jeopardy, he might need to play well in order to avoid being traded or to establish himself for upcoming contract negotiations.

When your job is on the line, the pressure to perform is constant, and it reallymakes comparatively little difference whether it's game seven of the World Series or a routine game in June.

I wonder, in fact, whether for some players stretch drive and postseason situations may actually help a little relieve the pressure a little, because they can focus on what they need to do to help their team and set aside worry about their personal circumstances.

[Pete Rose Rounding Third]

The statement you ascribe to sabrmetricians is probably from the infancy of the movement.

That seems likely, but I've never seen it revisited.


Talk about taking something one person said, ascribing it to "sabermetrics", and then railing against it.

Give me some time to gather my quotes, but I will reproduce actual quotes, not just my paraphrase.

[SamtheBravesFan]

That seems likely, but I've never seen it revisited.

Give me some time to gather my quotes, but I will reproduce actual quotes, not just my paraphrase.

Sounds good to me. I don't think I've seen many quotes like that.

[Pete Rose Rounding Third]

I assume Joe Sheehan is, on a left-to-right spectrum, much closer to the "sabermetrics" end than he is the "traditionalist" end.

Here he is from 2004 - not exactly the swaddling days for sabermetrics - saying the very thing I argued against:


The correct idea is that clutch performances exist, and clutch players exist: every last one of them. (emphasis by Sheehan)

All major-league players have a demonstrated ability to perform under pressure. They've proven that by rising to the top of an enormous pyramid of players, tens of thousands of them, all trying to be one of the top 0.1% that gets to call themselves "major leaguers." Within this group of elite, who have proven themselves to be the best in the world at their jobs, there is no discernable change in their abilities when runners are on base, or when the game is tied in extra innings, or when candy and costumes and pumpkins decorate the local GigaMart.

Am I misreading Sheehan here? Of course, I believe what the research says - but I don't believe they are all clutch. Relative to the population, yes - but I don't believe they all have the same mental makeup in these situations.

There's one not-too-antiquated quote. And here's the link (http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=2656).

[leewileyfan]

Am I misreading Sheehan here? Of course, I believe what the research says - but I don't believe they are all clutch. Relative to the population, yes - but I don't believe they all have the same mental makeup in these situations.

I believe if you are focused on the above, you may well be misreading Sheehan.

He seems to be arguing that, having reached the epitome in their field, they are collectively and uniformly immunized to situational pressure [WS]; distraction [the suggested garish State Fair setting] and the fans.

Anyone who has ever played on a team with an extended schedule of games has, at one time or another, played with a guy that seems to be hittin @ .420 because he's always there when you need him most. You hear that his average is .287; and it comes as a shock

[mikefast]

I assume Joe Sheehan is, on a left-to-right spectrum, much closer to the "sabermetrics" end than he is the "traditionalist" end.

If that's your only dimension, maybe so, but Sheehan is really just a writer who reads sabermetric stuff and gives his opinion on things. He's not doing any studies of his own.

But as with any other field, you can always find somebody with an opinion that reflects what you are trying to find. If I were looking for somebody to guide my sabermetric thinking, BP's Sheehan would fall pretty low on the list.

The Book, by Tango, Lichtman, and Dolphin, and published in 2007 by Potomac (although I think they may have self-published an earlier version) is considered the definitive study on clutch hitting as far as I know.


Batters perform slightly differently when under pressure. About one in six players increases his inherent “OBP skill” by eight points or more in high-pressure situations; a comparable number of players decreases it by eight points or more.


So, the entire problem rests on the fact that the hitting talent in MLB is so narrow to begin with, and that even though we have determined that clutch skill exists in that population of players, it is simply too hard to identify the specific players that it makes any practical difference.

To conclude: yes, clutch skill exists. No, it’s not that big a deal (at best, half as wide as than the platoon advantage). Correct, teams should not rely on clutch skill in their decision-making process, other than as a tie-breaker.

You can read more here:
http://www.insidethebook.com/ee/index.php/site/comments/clutch_skill_does_exist/

[Pete Rose Rounding Third]

I don't doubt that you're right about Sheehan and his sabermetric research (or, as you say, lack thereof), but is it not fair to say he is definitely more closely aligned with the sabermetric approach than the "traditional" approach? (As an aside, I can't figure out what word opposes sabermetric)


But as with any other field, you can always find somebody with an opinion that reflects what you are trying to find.

If by this you mean that I had some kind of "discredit sabermetrics" mindset behind the original post, I can assure you that's not the case. I much prefer the analysis by the sabermetrically-inclined writers to the others. It's just that, in the course of my reading, I have encountered this idea that MLers are immune to pressure because they are MLers on several occasions. I wasn't looking for it as much as it has stayed with me.

Here is that same idea, expressed another way, by Rob Neyer in 1999. Now, like Sheehan, I don't know how much sabermetric research Neyer does either, but Neyer doesn't strike me as a Jon Heyman/Tracy Rigolsby type of writer who knows a HOF when he sees one and places a premium on BA:


What are major league baseball players? Essentially, they're athletes who have been promoted as far as they can be promoted. There is no higher league. You know what I think? I think that in the great majority of cases, baseball players who can't handle pressure simply don't reach the major leagues. Those guys get weeded out on the way up, because in essence every professional at-bat is a "pressure situation." Wouldn't you agree that standing at home plate with thousands of eyes watching, and a behemoth throwing a baseball 95 miles an hour at you from 60 feet away, is a "pressure situation"?

And here is that link. (http://www.diamond-mind.com/articles/neyerclutch.htm) I've been looking for a more recent Neyer piece than this on the subject, but I haven't found it yet.

[brett]

It's self-relative only. It does not account for league performance.


And is it based on OPS+ splits or linear weights splits?

[Second Base Coach]

Ugh... every 6 months or so I read something about clutch hitting and I find myself reminding people that if clutch hitting DOES exist, then so does clutch pitching. And if clutch hitting and pitching does exist, and if there are players who repeated perform better in tough spots, then there must also be players who are likely to "choke".

And if the chokers can be identified because of a repeated pattern of behavior in tough spots, (or high "leverage" or whatever you want to call it for your own research) then we have the clutch guys.... the play as usual guys... and the chokers.

I am guessing as groups they cancel each other out as statistical populations.

And if there is a bell curve in this mess somewhere, I would think that any one player you might think is clutch may not be that far off of his regular numbers, and to call him clutch may not be accurate because it would be just as correct for me to label him as a non-choker.

The debate does not really bother me, but I am of the party that it is possible for some players to be less nervous in tough spots. I don't think anyone can suddenly become a better player just because it is the post season, or with runners on base, or whatever. But if he has the ability to concentrate and rise to the level of the moment in his mind, then perhaps he is less likely to choke, or at the very least not fall below his career numbers to the point of running the risk of becoming labeled as a choker.

I would write more about clutch pitching, but I am afraid I would repeat myself in most cases, and the argument is not as strong of course as the pitcher's success is somewhat dependent on the percentage of non-chokers he is facing in the line up that day as well as how many clutch fielders he has behind him at that moment. :hide:

[ipitch]

Ugh... every 6 months or so I read something about clutch hitting and I find myself reminding people that if clutch hitting DOES exist, then so does clutch pitching. And if clutch hitting and pitching does exist, and if there are players who repeated perform better in tough spots, then there must also be players who are likely to "choke".

Isn't it kind of funny that these "clutch" players perform below their ability in less important situations? Can't they concentrate when the crowd is quiet? :shrug:

[spark240]

Isn't it kind of funny that these "clutch" players perform below their ability in less important situations? Can't they concentrate when the crowd is quiet? :shrug:

Nobody in any demanding field performs to 100% of their potential, 100% of the time.

[ipitch]

Nobody in any demanding field performs to 100% of their potential, 100% of the time.

I'm saying that they perform below their average in less important situations.

[spark240]

I'm saying that they perform below their average in less important situations.

If they perform above their average in some situations, they have to perform below their average in others. If they can match that variance to the importance of the situation, rather than the inverse, that would be very desirable indeed.

[ipitch]

If they perform above their average in some situations, they have to perform below their average in others.

I know. But, I don't think some people realize this. In order to be clutch, you have to be bad in some other situation.

[SABR Matt]

No...in order to be clutch as rigorously defined by the typical (falsely pursued) sabermetic experiment, you have to be above your own average in the clutch and below in other situations...but the right answer is as Tom Tango emphasized in his book...the best hitters in clutch situations will be...the best overall hitters. In other words...if you're a good hitter, you'll still be a good hitter when the game is on the line. I don't think there exists a player who is significantly worse than his averages in clutch situations to the point where his good surface stats are biased by performances in low leverage situations.

Not because players don't feel pressure...but because they respond to pressure in similar enough ways that the differences tend to be minor. That doesn't mean some don't suffer or do better than the norm...but it's going to be hard to see it in the metrics.

[NJYankeeFan]

I assume Joe Sheehan is, on a left-to-right spectrum, much closer to the "sabermetrics" end than he is the "traditionalist" end.

Here he is from 2004 - not exactly the swaddling days for sabermetrics - saying the very thing I argued against:



Am I misreading Sheehan here? Of course, I believe what the research says - but I don't believe they are all clutch. Relative to the population, yes - but I don't believe they all have the same mental makeup in these situations.

There's one not-too-antiquated quote. And here's the link (http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=2656).

Sheehan makes the point that there are zero players who have shown a statistically significant clutch ability. Bonds at one point was close to being statisticallly significant choker but then turned it around. For all of A-Rods well publicized failings his post-season career stats are remarkably close to his career stats.

Sheehan points out that the reason behind this is that if MLB players were not clutch they never would have gotten to the Major League level.

A legitimate point and one that I have never seen refuted by other than (bad) anecdotal evidence.

[spark240]

Sheehan points out that the reason behind this is that if MLB players were not clutch they never would have gotten to the Major League level.

Yes, players who make it to MLB are bound to be, as a group, more "clutch" than, say, average collegiate players. But that's not a useful statement. MLB players are also (as a group) faster runners, more powerful hitters, more accurate throwers, more sure fielders, better everything than any lesser group of players. Of course.

All of the distinctions that we make between this major leaguer and that one are going to be finer distinctions, more subtle differences than between either of them and Joe Schmo. They're still there, and in the specific environment of MLB, where everyone is (in the larger context) a superstar, those subtle differences in highly refined skills are magnified into significance.

[Tango Tiger]

I would not characterize the two articles by Sheehan and Neyer as representative of anything sabermetrics.

This is no different than a lawyer putting on the stand the two medical experts who he managed to find that is opposed to penicillin.

There is no uniformity of opinion regarding clutch, one way or the other, be it from sabermetricians, those who read about sabermetrics, those who write about sabermetrics, and those who have never heard of sabermetrics.

All I'm saying is not to use your paintbrush on all of us.

[Second Base Coach]

Isn't it kind of funny that these "clutch" players perform below their ability in less important situations? Can't they concentrate when the crowd is quiet? :shrug:

Another thing that drives me nuts is comparing a particular player to "the norm". What is that? The norm of the league, or what we can reasonably expect from HIM?

If Wade Boggs only hit .304 on Tuesdays after the seventh inning in the month of April, is that bad? For him? Does that make him less than clutch? Or very clutch because the league will surely hit less than that?

I just don't see how you can suddenly become better whenever you sense a greater moment is going on around you. It is much easier to become nervous in that situation and turn into some player who is more likely to choke more often than what can be normally expected from that player.

I think it is less about rising to the occasion and more about not being overwhelmed by the moment. No research here, no fancy numbers, just a belief it is easier to dial up your level of concentration rather than suddenly improve your overall level of ability. This assumes the player is trying his very very best all the time.

[spark240]

I just don't see how you can suddenly become better whenever you sense a greater moment is going on around you.

You don't? Have you ever worked on something important under pressure? How did you do?


it is easier to dial up your level of concentration rather than suddenly improve your overall level of ability.

Well, maybe that's the key. The thing is, most people (ballplayers or otherwise, I suspect) can't "dial up" at will. It's more like something that happens, under certain circumstances, for some people.

[csh19792001]

All data is meaningful. But, if your question is if the split is so meaningul that the split itself can be used without any regression, then the answer is 100% no.

Hi Tom,
Several questions....juxtaposed with you I'm a true neophyte here so please bear with me. :)

In your opinion, what threshold does a sample of behavior in cases like this become statistically significant (valid)? That is, I suppose, conclusions from which we can make summary conclusions that are valid and reliable.

Let's say a player came up as much as Pete Rose did in his career, with a career OPS+ of 100, and had an OPS+ of 120 in 3000 PA in "close and late" situations (let's assume those are the criteria we all agree on to define "clutch", for argument's sake). Obviously 300 PA isn't reliable, but is 3000? 5000?

Could we affix the qualitative description of "clutch" (assuming we all agree on the terminology)? How about the same hypo with "high leverage" situations and 3000 PA?

I also wonder about this with pitcher-batter matchups, especially given how much emphasis is placed on it by the media and by managers. Have you ever read "Three Nights in August"? Was Tom Glavine really just lucky against Brad Ausmus? Barry Bonds just got unlucky and his complete inability to hit Chuck McElroy was just random sample of behavior? If these guys got to face each other 250, 300 times how much would their performances progress to the mean?

If it turns out that Duke Snider's full career line is nearly identical to his 1953-65 performance, would you come to the conclusion that he really couldn't hit ML left handed pitching, or that he simply didn't face lefties enough?

[Pete Rose Rounding Third]

Tom:

Allow me to plead ignorance and ask: Where can I find more relevant summaries on the issue? Are there true sabermetricians who make an argument substantially different than those I posted by Neyer and Sheehan?

And I'm sorry I gave offense. I respect the hell out of the work that you and others do and I hope that, when I read other pieces from researchers, I can see for myself an acknowledgement that not all MLers have the same mental makeup.

I'm glad your work is out there. Without it, I'd have to hear a HOF 2Bman blather endlessly, without any counterpoint, to the effect that he can't evaluate guys he hasn't seen in person.

[brett]

Hi Tom,
Several questions....juxtaposed with you I'm a true neophyte here so please bear with me. :)

In your opinion, what threshold does a sample of behavior in cases like this become statistically significant (valid)? That is, I suppose, conclusions from which we can make summary conclusions that are valid and reliable.

Let's say a player came up as much as Pete Rose did in his career, with a career OPS+ of 100, and had an OPS+ of 120 in 3000 PA in "close and late" situations (let's assume those are the criteria we all agree on to define "clutch", for argument's sake). Obviously 300 PA isn't reliable, but is 3000? 5000?


I am not expert here with the stats, but I will say two things. There are two or three different factors that are not mutually inclusive.

1) One is the chance of the plate appearance producing a run, ie men on base and outs.

2) Two is the chance of a run affecting the game outcome (which I believe is what "leverage" is, and depends only on inning and score, and perhaps the run environment).

3) Three is the degree to which hitters/pitcher feel pressure and this is critical if we want to call it a skill.

Now I would argue that some players with different skill sets say contact and batting average versus high walks may have a tendancy to produce more or less based on variations of factor 1. A contact hitter may be better with 2 outs and a runner on second or 1 out and a runner on third and since those situations are more likely to affect runs, those players may tend to be more valuable, but not due to any psychological effects.

Also, it seems clear to me that some hitters (Joe Morgan) are affected negatively by having a runner on second base but that this has nothing particularly to do with the pressure of the situation.

My second point will be that if 2000 plate appearances is not a large enough sample size, then neither is evaluating a player's performance over the course of a single season.

George Brett has a 113 relative OPS+ in high leverage situations. He also was "known" as a great clutch hitter. Now it does look like hitters as a group do a little better in high leverage situations (pitchers are more negatively affected?), but still a 113 relative OPS+ for 2000 plate appearances is clearly due to there being something different about Brett than an average hitter, but separating that into "skill set" variations, ability to perform under pressure, and situational/strategic factors (IBB's for example) is not easy to do.

Furthermore, Nolan Ryan allowing a 113 relative OPS+ with runners on base (almost half of his batters faced) is meaningful though he only allowed 89 late and close. The first is a measure of value. The second is a measure of pressure (and value) in part, and so he may have been good under felt pressure and just poor with men on base.

[Tango Tiger]

Hi Tom,
Several questions....juxtaposed with you I'm a true neophyte here so please bear with me. :)

I think you'd appreciate The Book based on your questions that follow (free reading at Amazon.com).


In your opinion, what threshold does a sample of behavior in cases like this become statistically significant (valid)? That is, I suppose, conclusions from which we can make summary conclusions that are valid and reliable.

Roughly when you have 5000 or 6000 career PA, then your "true" clutch skill is halfway between your performance in that category to your overall performance.

In comparison, when you have 200 career PA, then your "true" overall skill batting is halfway between your performance in that category and that of the league.



I also wonder about this with pitcher-batter matchups, especially given how much emphasis is placed on it by the media and by managers. Have you ever read "Three Nights in August"? Was Tom Glavine really just lucky against Brad Ausmus? Barry Bonds just got unlucky and his complete inability to hit Chuck McElroy was just random sample of behavior? If these guys got to face each other 250, 300 times how much would their performances progress to the mean?

I don't know the exact answer, but it's going to be on the order of like clutch hitting.


If it turns out that Duke Snider's full career line is nearly identical to his 1953-65 performance, would you come to the conclusion that he really couldn't hit ML left handed pitching, or that he simply didn't face lefties enough?

If a LHH has 1000 PA against LHP, then his "true" "split" skill is halfway between his observed splits and the league splits.

This is all based on absence of other information. You can argue that Ichiro has reverse split skill, but you have to include the fact that this is ICHIRO and not some batter who happens to have those split stats.

[Tango Tiger]

Tom:

Allow me to plead ignorance and ask: Where can I find more relevant summaries on the issue? Are there true sabermetricians who make an argument substantially different than those I posted by Neyer and Sheehan?

And I'm sorry I gave offense. I respect the hell out of the work that you and others do and I hope that, when I read other pieces from researchers, I can see for myself an acknowledgement that not all MLers have the same mental makeup.

I'm glad your work is out there. Without it, I'd have to hear a HOF 2Bman blather endlessly, without any counterpoint, to the effect that he can't evaluate guys he hasn't seen in person.

I don't know where you can find relevant summaries. You can try the various wikis. And Cy Morong has a clutch webpage.

I appreciate the kind words, and I didn't take offense. Just making a point that we're individuals, and we don't all subscribe to the same gospel.

[barzilla]

A couple of salient points I'm not sure if anyone has contributed here, but when we look at clutch performance one of the issues is that you have two actors here. Could the pitcher also be a clutch performer or non-clutch performer? It seems to me that good pitchers are good because they are able to perform in certain situations just like those that look at a clutch hitter. So, where do we draw the line between clutch pitching and clutch hitting (or the reverse)?

Secondly, as I am sure Tango and Matt have done in their research, we need a baseline of average performance in any given situation. It is foolish to me to assume the average in all situations when any given situation might create an imbalance one way or the other. For instance, I would assume that hitters in general perform differently with men on base than with the bases empty. One of the definitions of clutch is with men on base. If we assume intuitively that a pitcher might have to pitch around the plate more often with men on base then we would expect OBP rates to change as well as BA and SLG rates. Of course, these are just considerations.

I've always been skeptical of measuring clutch simply because it is so hard to define which situations logically apply. As somone that is a sabermetrician in my spare time, I would say that I know it is exists, but simply we have come to a point in the field where we don't have universal agreement on how to measure it. I could be wrong and often am, but that is my sense of it.

[leewileyfan]

Clutch is increasingly diminished as a possibility with each restriction added to its defining qualifications:

-By some measures, any contest between KCR and CLE during Aug-Sept '09 would be tossed aside because there is little to nothing on the line between two non-contenders. Thus, heroics by David DeJesus, Jose Guillen, Asdrubial Cabrera or Shin-Soo Choo would go on the heap in any four game series between the two teams.

-However, in such contests and the personal struggles of a player in a rookie year; an option season; an adjustment to new surroundings; or playing one's heart out to get noticed for a possible trade away from a dead-end franchise.

Take, for example, the case of Jacoby Ellsbury during 2008. Manny departs and Jason Bay arrives. Coco Crisp is becoming a questionable fixture in CF; and Rocco Baldelli, if healthy, is back for another shot, perhaps also in CF. Every appearance is clutch in such surroundings; but I wouldn't begin to argue for that extent of generosity.

-Clutch articles and blogs, like Cyril Morongs's, allude to the principle of a clutch player performing above his non-pressure norm in "qualifying" clutch situations. IFthis were literally the standard, I'd have to toss all considerations of Pujols, Jeter, Guerrero, Bonds et. al. on the trash heap and declare that clutch doesn't exist. Why? Because a .340 hitter, .410 OB%, .550 SLG has too high a standard to measure up to.

Here are the points I'm exploring now [no deadline, no pressure] for yeat another perspective [for me] on clutch:

1. Start with MLB splits for season being considered, beginning with BA in situation, and including K% for each:

LG.....Overall AVG....... <0-1 Count........3B<2O............RISP

N.L.. .259; 20.8%... .228; 28.76%....319; 21.68%.. .265; 22.1%

A.L. .267; 19.63%.. .236; 26.48%....334; 21.08%.. .264; 20.8%

If I find similar splits for High Leverage AB, I'll add this as well. One entry I will use, NOT for BA but for K rate; and that is 3B<2O. In a similar study last year [never posted, just a personal exercise], this single observation revealed two famous players at opposite ends of the spectrum:

-Alfonso Soriano, whose high K rate rose in the 3B<2O situation;

-Albert Pujols, whose already low K rate fell considerably in the same situation.

There were others with telling numbers in that small category; and what it suggests to me is a distinction between thinking/aware hitters who adapt to situational demands, and those who mindlessly sing away in any situation [usually with predictably disappointing results].

For clutch to reveal itself, I suggest more inclusion & less exclusion.