538280
04-16-2007, 06:47 PM
I read this book in the summer of 2005 (a little less than two years ago), and lately I've been re-reading parts of it. I like the book, and I generally agree with what James says about arguments for the HOF, I agree that most of the arguments you hear on radio talk shows or on TV or in magazines and newspapers tend to be weak and poorly constructed. I think for people unfamiliar with arguing about players it is a very good read and can help you to sift out what is a legitimate argument from what is a bad one. I think it gives good ways to show evidence to support your claims rather than just throwing them out there. I also think the historical info in the book is great. It was great to read detailed accounts of the lives of baseball figures such as Joe Tinker, George Davis, Vern Stephens, and Phil Rizzuto among others. You come away from the book knowing a lot more about the players as people as well as their HOF credentials.
But I also think the book has a number of flaws which aren't mentioned so often. Upon rereading it, with more knowledge than I used to have, I find myself thinking that many of the methods and arguments he makes in the book aren't particularly useful and can lead you to believe an undeserving candidate is worthy perhaps even more so than the other way around. I also think a lot of the arguments he uses himself in favor of or against a candidate aren't particularly meaningful and he often makes broad general statements (Drysdale benifitted from the environment he played in) rather than taking steps to quantify exactly how much he was helped by those conditions.
To begin with I'll talk about the methods a little bit. I know that I've criticized them enough so many of you are probably already familiar with my problems with them, but of the different statistical tools James introduces in the book to see if a player is worthy or not of the HOF, I don't find any of them to be particularly useful. Black Ink is 1. Primarily weighted on the triple crown stats and other counting stats such as hits and runs which just are not good ways, by themselves, to try to determine the true worth of a player. OBP isn't even included in Black Ink. They also deal with league leaderships which are very arbitrary in nature. You may actually do better in a category one year and not lead the league yet do worse another year and lead the league. Babe Ruth won the batting title with a .378 BA yet didn't when he hit .393. Comparing players to the league average is a formal methology of determining a player's value; that should always be done in preference to looking at league leads. We have many things readily available which do that and it's not hard to do anyway so I don't think it's appropriate to focus on league leads at all. I also feel that this method reinforces what many think is a big problem with the voting from the BBWAA, which is that they often don't realize the inherent value of offense from a key defensive positoin, where that player is making defensive contributions as well, vs. from a corner OF or 1B. This methods doesn't take into account defensive ability or position.
HOF Standards are almost entirely based on counting stats which again I think totally miss the point of what players do to help their teams win games for the most part. I'm almost asking Bill James, Bill, you created measures such as runs created, you know that statistics such as OBP and SLG far better model run scoring than the triple crown stats (and RBI which is situational, dependant on those around you and your lineup spot), why don't your measures to determine HOF worthiness fall more along those lines-with things that you yourself have frequently shown which really equal victories in the standings? They also are based totally on raw numbers, with no attention paid to the environment in which a player played. Because of this players from hitters' eras like the 20s, 30s, 90s, and 2000s come out overrated by this method and players from pitchers eras like the 00s, 10s, 60s, and 70s are underrated (generally). This method does factor in position but ignores defensive ability, which is a problem.
Similarity scores are subject to many of the same criticisms as HOF Standards. They are based only on career counting stats which aren't really good indicators of actual value, and they totally ignore how great a player was at his best. They have no era adjustment at all. On BBRef you can see each player's top 10 most Similar players, you can see each player's OPS+ there. It is clear from this that the similarity lists created for many players form low run environments are not accurate. In his Keltner List chapter James lists Tony Oliva's most similar players as if it is a negative to his HOF case, because the list of those players aren't impressive. Oliva in his career had a 131 OPS+. The average of his comps is 114. It is clear that the comp list is not fair to Oliva, because Oliva played in a pitcher's era, the 60s an 70s. This is just one example of how those methods can (and do), lead you to false conclusions. If the system was put together with context adjustmetns perhaps the system would compare to modern outfielders like Kirby Puckett (124 OPS+), who in the context of their time, are much more similar to Oliva as hitters than players like Garret Anderson (105 OPS+), and Jeff Conine (109). I normally don't support Oliva as a HOFer anyway, so I'm not making his case, I'm just showing how the method is very flawed and it even leads James to what IMO is a false conclusion.
I had thought for a long time that James really only created these "metrics" to try to predict who would have the HOF as many people have said that since I read the book. I think it is clear from reading it over again that that was not his intent. The only one that was created to predict how the BBWAA would handle the player, rather than their actual worthiness, was the HOF Monitor. Here is a quote from the book, pg. 68:
"The monitor is a amoral system, it is concerned with what does happen in the voting, not what should, and thus it gives various accomplishments a somewhat illogical weight, to make players' records match up with the voting. Getting 200 hits in a season, for some reason, has always impressed Hall of Fame voters (or at least the players who have done that have always done well in HOF voting), so that gets a comparatively heavy weight. Driving in 100 runs or scoring 100 runs appears to mean less, so it gets less weight. This isn't my judgement, it just reflects the voting.
The Standards List doesn't make any attempt to predict the voting, it just evaluates the players' records in a kind of a common-sense way, and then centers the results at 50 percent.
To state this another way, it would disturb the design of the HOF Monitor if a player who actually is in the HOF, like Lloyd Waner or George Kelly, had a very low total, while a contemporary who isn't had a high total. If that happened, I would try to find some way to adjust the system so that the selected player had a better total. The Standards List doesn't care that there are players with 50+ totals who are out and players with 25 who are in, that's just the breaks of the voting."
From that I think it is clear that James created a system such as HOF Standards trying to absolutely not reflect the actual HOF selection process, he basically just directly states that there. I still am wondering why James did create methods like that though that are so flawed for this book. In his other books he creates methods such as WS or RC which really do reflect a player's contributions to their teams winning and scoring runs. That is what the game is all about, that is what should, IMO, become part of whether deserves the HOF or not. Not a big mess of counting stats thrown together to create a totally arbitrary number that really means very little about a player's value and doesn't reflect it in any way. I think we've seen better from James and I certainly have. I still think all the methods created in that book are overused here (though it has been getting better). I don't think they're useful at all.
I also think some arguments made in the book are not particularly useful or convincing. James spends a lot of time ripping those arguments commonly made by others (and I think his criticisms there are legit), but he makes many shaky arguments himself IMO, particularly in his chapter about Don Drysdale. He makes an argument for and against Drysdale, to show both sides of the story, and I think both arguments aren't particularly well constructed and contain many irrelevent points. He makes very general statements, that strikeouts help Drysdale, that the team didn't score many runs for him, that his won-lost record isn't accurate in his actual value, a lot of general statements, but without a lot of data to support that those things really matter or are even true or exactly how much Drysdale benifitted from those things. He also goes on and on about how Drysdale actually pitched better than pitchers with better won-lost records. But to me that is a very flawed argument, just because these pitchers had better won-lost records than Drysdale with higher ERAs doesn't mean that Drysdale deserves those records-and James seems to imply that. On the other side, James makes arguments in response to that Drysdale struck out a lot of batters than pitchers like Sam McDowell did as well and they're not in the HOF. Yes, Bill, but that's the point; the point is that a lot of Ks are a point in Drysdale's favor, not that every pitcher who struck out a lot of batters should also be in the HOF.
Another thing is James' almost total reliance on won-lost records in evaluating pitchers. He goes on and on about what is a HOF caliber won-lost record and even creates a system called Fibonacci Win Points to put won-lost records on a different scale given winning percentages. I think that won-lost records are almost useless. I can't think of one thing won-lost record attempts to quantify that isn't quantified better by something else. And the fact we put wins and losses on pitchers indicates that pitching is mostly responsible for why teams win games but it's not. Pitchign is probalby about 40% of why teams win games. Scoring runs and giving up runs are both half, and pitching doesn't get all the credit for preventing runs becaue fielding actually factors in, so a pitcher has about 40% control by himself of the game yet he's supposed to be responsible for the whole 100% by the logic of won-lost records. They're useless when you also have other things and dont' deserve a big piece in any evaluation of pitchers IMO yet James refers to them probalby more than anything else regarding pitchers Again I think, by his other writing, that James realizes this, yet he seems not to in the this book.
Overall, I like the book for the other things I mentioned, but I think it has a lot of negatives as well that are often ignored. I've seen a lot better from James.
But I also think the book has a number of flaws which aren't mentioned so often. Upon rereading it, with more knowledge than I used to have, I find myself thinking that many of the methods and arguments he makes in the book aren't particularly useful and can lead you to believe an undeserving candidate is worthy perhaps even more so than the other way around. I also think a lot of the arguments he uses himself in favor of or against a candidate aren't particularly meaningful and he often makes broad general statements (Drysdale benifitted from the environment he played in) rather than taking steps to quantify exactly how much he was helped by those conditions.
To begin with I'll talk about the methods a little bit. I know that I've criticized them enough so many of you are probably already familiar with my problems with them, but of the different statistical tools James introduces in the book to see if a player is worthy or not of the HOF, I don't find any of them to be particularly useful. Black Ink is 1. Primarily weighted on the triple crown stats and other counting stats such as hits and runs which just are not good ways, by themselves, to try to determine the true worth of a player. OBP isn't even included in Black Ink. They also deal with league leaderships which are very arbitrary in nature. You may actually do better in a category one year and not lead the league yet do worse another year and lead the league. Babe Ruth won the batting title with a .378 BA yet didn't when he hit .393. Comparing players to the league average is a formal methology of determining a player's value; that should always be done in preference to looking at league leads. We have many things readily available which do that and it's not hard to do anyway so I don't think it's appropriate to focus on league leads at all. I also feel that this method reinforces what many think is a big problem with the voting from the BBWAA, which is that they often don't realize the inherent value of offense from a key defensive positoin, where that player is making defensive contributions as well, vs. from a corner OF or 1B. This methods doesn't take into account defensive ability or position.
HOF Standards are almost entirely based on counting stats which again I think totally miss the point of what players do to help their teams win games for the most part. I'm almost asking Bill James, Bill, you created measures such as runs created, you know that statistics such as OBP and SLG far better model run scoring than the triple crown stats (and RBI which is situational, dependant on those around you and your lineup spot), why don't your measures to determine HOF worthiness fall more along those lines-with things that you yourself have frequently shown which really equal victories in the standings? They also are based totally on raw numbers, with no attention paid to the environment in which a player played. Because of this players from hitters' eras like the 20s, 30s, 90s, and 2000s come out overrated by this method and players from pitchers eras like the 00s, 10s, 60s, and 70s are underrated (generally). This method does factor in position but ignores defensive ability, which is a problem.
Similarity scores are subject to many of the same criticisms as HOF Standards. They are based only on career counting stats which aren't really good indicators of actual value, and they totally ignore how great a player was at his best. They have no era adjustment at all. On BBRef you can see each player's top 10 most Similar players, you can see each player's OPS+ there. It is clear from this that the similarity lists created for many players form low run environments are not accurate. In his Keltner List chapter James lists Tony Oliva's most similar players as if it is a negative to his HOF case, because the list of those players aren't impressive. Oliva in his career had a 131 OPS+. The average of his comps is 114. It is clear that the comp list is not fair to Oliva, because Oliva played in a pitcher's era, the 60s an 70s. This is just one example of how those methods can (and do), lead you to false conclusions. If the system was put together with context adjustmetns perhaps the system would compare to modern outfielders like Kirby Puckett (124 OPS+), who in the context of their time, are much more similar to Oliva as hitters than players like Garret Anderson (105 OPS+), and Jeff Conine (109). I normally don't support Oliva as a HOFer anyway, so I'm not making his case, I'm just showing how the method is very flawed and it even leads James to what IMO is a false conclusion.
I had thought for a long time that James really only created these "metrics" to try to predict who would have the HOF as many people have said that since I read the book. I think it is clear from reading it over again that that was not his intent. The only one that was created to predict how the BBWAA would handle the player, rather than their actual worthiness, was the HOF Monitor. Here is a quote from the book, pg. 68:
"The monitor is a amoral system, it is concerned with what does happen in the voting, not what should, and thus it gives various accomplishments a somewhat illogical weight, to make players' records match up with the voting. Getting 200 hits in a season, for some reason, has always impressed Hall of Fame voters (or at least the players who have done that have always done well in HOF voting), so that gets a comparatively heavy weight. Driving in 100 runs or scoring 100 runs appears to mean less, so it gets less weight. This isn't my judgement, it just reflects the voting.
The Standards List doesn't make any attempt to predict the voting, it just evaluates the players' records in a kind of a common-sense way, and then centers the results at 50 percent.
To state this another way, it would disturb the design of the HOF Monitor if a player who actually is in the HOF, like Lloyd Waner or George Kelly, had a very low total, while a contemporary who isn't had a high total. If that happened, I would try to find some way to adjust the system so that the selected player had a better total. The Standards List doesn't care that there are players with 50+ totals who are out and players with 25 who are in, that's just the breaks of the voting."
From that I think it is clear that James created a system such as HOF Standards trying to absolutely not reflect the actual HOF selection process, he basically just directly states that there. I still am wondering why James did create methods like that though that are so flawed for this book. In his other books he creates methods such as WS or RC which really do reflect a player's contributions to their teams winning and scoring runs. That is what the game is all about, that is what should, IMO, become part of whether deserves the HOF or not. Not a big mess of counting stats thrown together to create a totally arbitrary number that really means very little about a player's value and doesn't reflect it in any way. I think we've seen better from James and I certainly have. I still think all the methods created in that book are overused here (though it has been getting better). I don't think they're useful at all.
I also think some arguments made in the book are not particularly useful or convincing. James spends a lot of time ripping those arguments commonly made by others (and I think his criticisms there are legit), but he makes many shaky arguments himself IMO, particularly in his chapter about Don Drysdale. He makes an argument for and against Drysdale, to show both sides of the story, and I think both arguments aren't particularly well constructed and contain many irrelevent points. He makes very general statements, that strikeouts help Drysdale, that the team didn't score many runs for him, that his won-lost record isn't accurate in his actual value, a lot of general statements, but without a lot of data to support that those things really matter or are even true or exactly how much Drysdale benifitted from those things. He also goes on and on about how Drysdale actually pitched better than pitchers with better won-lost records. But to me that is a very flawed argument, just because these pitchers had better won-lost records than Drysdale with higher ERAs doesn't mean that Drysdale deserves those records-and James seems to imply that. On the other side, James makes arguments in response to that Drysdale struck out a lot of batters than pitchers like Sam McDowell did as well and they're not in the HOF. Yes, Bill, but that's the point; the point is that a lot of Ks are a point in Drysdale's favor, not that every pitcher who struck out a lot of batters should also be in the HOF.
Another thing is James' almost total reliance on won-lost records in evaluating pitchers. He goes on and on about what is a HOF caliber won-lost record and even creates a system called Fibonacci Win Points to put won-lost records on a different scale given winning percentages. I think that won-lost records are almost useless. I can't think of one thing won-lost record attempts to quantify that isn't quantified better by something else. And the fact we put wins and losses on pitchers indicates that pitching is mostly responsible for why teams win games but it's not. Pitchign is probalby about 40% of why teams win games. Scoring runs and giving up runs are both half, and pitching doesn't get all the credit for preventing runs becaue fielding actually factors in, so a pitcher has about 40% control by himself of the game yet he's supposed to be responsible for the whole 100% by the logic of won-lost records. They're useless when you also have other things and dont' deserve a big piece in any evaluation of pitchers IMO yet James refers to them probalby more than anything else regarding pitchers Again I think, by his other writing, that James realizes this, yet he seems not to in the this book.
Overall, I like the book for the other things I mentioned, but I think it has a lot of negatives as well that are often ignored. I've seen a lot better from James.