Teams like the 1991 Tigers

[digglahhh]

The 1991 Tigers, who I often sarcastically refer to as the sabermetric dream team, lead the league in HRs, Ks and BBs. I was curious if anybody could tell me if any other team has done this, I would assume its been done a handful of times before.

Thank you in advance.

[SABR Matt]

The 1991 Tigers, who I often sarcastically refer to as the sabermetric dream team, lead the league in HRs, Ks and BBs. I was curious if anybody could tell me if any other team has done this, I would assume its been done a handful of times before.

Thank you in advance.

No sabermetrician would call the '91 Tigers a sabermetric dream team. Relatively weak pitching and HORRIBLE team defense do not a sabermetric dream team make.

[RuthMayBond]

No sabermetrician would call the '91 Tigers a sabermetric dream team. Relatively weak pitching and HORRIBLE team defense do not a sabermetric dream team make.I think diglah was referring to the offense. I'm not sure why leading the league in Ks would be part of a dream but try the '76 Reds, '26-28, '30, '37-38 Yanks, '30 Cubs, '26 Cards, '11-12 Bosox?, '07 Giants. The '69 Bosox, '66 Tigers, '66 Braves, '65 Bosox, '62 Tigers, '52-55 Dodgers, 45 Yanks!, '36 Yanks!, 32 Phils, 31 Yanks were pretty close.

[RuthMayBond]

The 1991 Tigers, who I often sarcastically refer to as the sabermetric dream team, lead the league in HRs, Ks and BBs. I was curious if anybody could tell me if any other team has done this, I would assume its been done a handful of times before.

Thank you in advance.The sabermetric offensive dream team would be more like leading the league in OBP+, OPS+, OPS+ with RISP, and, if we could get it, SLG+ and HRs.

[digglahhh]

Thanks a lot.

The dream team part was obvious sarcasm. I basically meant that the 91 Tigers seem to support the idea that batting average is secondary to OBP and SLG and that walking is very important. They're offense was Adam Dunn on a team level, low BA, tons of Ks, lots of walks heavily reliant on slugging, yet overall highly productive. They were second in the league in runs scored and offer evidence that Ks are not really worse than other outs, and walking and slugging is a viable offensive strategy.

With that said, I think that this team is somewhat of a mirage. The low average and high K totals are very much due to two players, Rob Deer and Pete Incagivlia- two weaker versions of Dave Kingman.

[538280]

I think diglah was referring to the offense. I'm not sure why leading the league in Ks would be part of a dream but try the '76 Reds, '26-28, '30, '37-38 Yanks, '30 Cubs, '26 Cards, '11-12 Bosox?, '07 Yanks. The '69 Bosox, '66 Tigers, '66 Braves, '65 Bosox, '62 Tigers, '52-55 Dodgers, 45 Yanks!, '36 Yanks!, 32 Phils, 31 Yanks were pretty close.

Ironically (or perhaps not) those teams are all great offensive teams. Pretty much sticks a dagger through the heart of the ElHalo offensive strategy.

[digglahhh]

Ironically (or perhaps not) those teams are all great offensive teams. Pretty much sticks a dagger through the heart of the ElHalo offensive strategy.

Right, but did they all also have the lowest team BA in the league?

[RuthMayBond]

Right, but did they all also have the lowest team BA in the league?38 Yanks were pretty close, 37 Yanks weren't far ahead/behind?

[SABR Matt]

Thanks a lot.

The dream team part was obvious sarcasm. I basically meant that the 91 Tigers seem to support the idea that batting average is secondary to OBP and SLG and that walking is very important. They're offense was Adam Dunn on a team level, low BA, tons of Ks, lots of walks heavily reliant on slugging, yet overall highly productive. They were second in the league in runs scored and offer evidence that Ks are not really worse than other outs, and walking and slugging is a viable offensive strategy.

With that said, I think that this team is somewhat of a mirage. The low average and high K totals are very much due to two players, Rob Deer and Pete Incagivlia- two weaker versions of Dave Kingman.

Didn't that team also have Mickey Tettleton? Hitting like .241 with HRs and a BUNCH of Ks? And Cecil Fielder not exactly light on the Ks?

[SABR Matt]

Yep...that team had Tettleton and Fielder who combined for like 290 Ks and 180 BBs...LOL

Of course Rob Deer and Pete Inkaviglia soaking up 700 ABs worth of .180 hitting is gonna pull down a team's BA...but the rest of that team wasn't exactly lighting it up with the BA.

[Ubiquitous]

As far as I can tell the only other team to do it in the AL was the Yankees. In 1926, 1927, 1928, 1930, and 1938. Its possible that Boston in 1912 did it as well but they did not keep track of strikeouts.

[SABR Matt]

Ironically enough...those Yankee teams were consistantly among the best offenses in the game's history. So...I'm thinking the sabermetric dream-offense isn't far from reality.

[Ubiquitous]

For the NL it has happened to:
1887 Chicago
1926 Cardinals
1930 Cubs
1976 Reds

with possibly the 1904 and 1907 Giants doint it as well.

In 1926 the Cardinals won the pennant, in 1930 the Cubs finished 2 games back, and in 1976 the Reds won the pennant.

[SABR Matt]

and 1887 CHI was a good offense...just a poor defense...common for 19th century teams (because of all the errors and weird parks and bad equipment and the offensively biased scoring environment.

[Ubiquitous]

The 1887 team had a good defense and pitching the offense wasn't all that hot, and the strikeouts probably had something to do with it. This team led the leagues in homers and walks yets scored the 5th most runs in a league of 8. Meanwhile they allow the third fewest runs in the league. In that day and age with the field conditions and the equipment they should not have been striking out so much. They should have been putting the ball in play more often and gotten themselves more runners. On top of that they had the second most stolen bases in the league. So you got to figure that means that they probably have a really high caught stealing rate as well, which again removes runners from the basepaths. So while the Cubs hit almost double the amount of homers the average non-Chicago team hit they did not manage to capitalize on it with extra runs.

[SABR Matt]

Hold on a second here...I agree with you that striking out was worse in 1887 than it is now (when you put the ball in play now, it's an out a lot...back then it was an error a lot)...but that 1887 team was a solid offense...disguised by a non-favorable field for hitting. 5th of 8 is a bit deceiving here.

they were pretty average across the board it appears.

[SABR Matt]

OK...here's what I have for the 1887 Cubs by the FSIA.

The FSIA on the 1887 Cubs:

Intrinsic Offense: -0.700 R/G
Intrinsic Defense: +0.555 R/G
Intrinsic League: +1.030 R/G
Intrinsic Park: +0.555 R/G
Offensive Park Reactions: +0.773 R/G
Defensive Park Reactions: +0.303 R/G

The defense was a little better than the offense...but the offense..if you include the park reactions was about average.

[Ubiquitous]

How was the park a bad place to hit? The park was the reason they hit 80 homers and led the league in homers?


In 1960 AL (earliest I can find) a batter ROE in roughly 1.6% of AB's. The AL that year committed 1040 errors in 1887 the league committed 3652 errors. I would not be shocked at all to see the ROE somewhere around 7% nor would it shock me to see it at around 10% either. Cut down on the power stroke, diminishing strikeouts, pop ups, and flyballs in huge fields and you probably put 500 or so more balls on the ground instead of in gloves. Some of those are going to fall in for hits, and probably around 40 are going to become ROE. I think the 30 or so homers you lose is more then made up for with the additional baserunners.

[Ubiquitous]

At home the Cubs scored 552 runs, away 261. Visitors scored 366 runs at the Cubs park while they scored 349 at their park. Again I'm not seeing how the Cubs (white stockings) were hurt because of their park.

[SABR Matt]

I'm not disagreeing with you on the problem with hitting for power in 1887...as I said, I agree putting it in play was good back then.

But while that park was a hitter's park, they performed even BETTER there as a team than you would expect them to perform...it was masking a weak offense and making them score at an average rate even after you remove the park effect...that's what I was trying to say...it didn't come out right at all...LOL

[SABR Matt]

At home the Cubs scored 552 runs, away 261. Visitors scored 366 runs at the Cubs park while they scored 349 at their park. Again I'm not seeing how the Cubs (white stockings) were hurt because of their park.

That WILD split is the problem. It wasn't THAT good a hitter's park...it was a hitter's park, but they turned it into a PARADISE...for them. That split is out of control...LOL

[SABR Matt]

I guess the point I was trying to make...guys like Ned Williamson figured out that you could score a lot of runs at home if you tried to hit for power because that park was a HR-favoring park...so they did. So while intrinsically that offense was bad because they weren't putting it in play...they come out about average overall because the team figured out how to score runs in their park and no one else did.

[Ubiquitous]

OK...here's what I have for the 1887 Cubs by the FSIA.

The FSIA on the 1887 Cubs:

Intrinsic Offense: -0.700 R/G
Intrinsic Defense: +0.555 R/G
Intrinsic League: +1.030 R/G
Intrinsic Park: +0.555 R/G
Offensive Park Reactions: +0.773 R/G
Defensive Park Reactions: +0.303 R/G

The defense was a little better than the offense...but the offense..if you include the park reactions was about average.

Your stat is wrong. There is no way that West Side Park cost them 47 runs over the season. The Cubs at home in 67 games scored almost as many runs as Washington in 123 games. 552 runs to 601. The team averaged 8.2 runs per game at home, only the Detroit score more per game at home then Chicago at 8.39. Besides those two no other team even gets close to 8 runs per game at home with the next highest at 7.35 in Boston, then several almost 7's and then the bottom three slightly above 5 runs per game. Yet somehow ther park according to you was a below average run environment. On top of that only the bottom dwelling Indianapolis and Washington allowed more runs to score at home the White Stockings. Yet on the road only New York I believe allows less runs to score then the White Sox. No that stadium was a bonus to offenses not a minus.

[SABR Matt]

I think you misunderstand the stat.

It doesn't say the park COST them 47 runs...it says they got 47 extra runs out of the park above and beyond what would be expected...it says the park was less hitter friendly than they made it appear...

And I believe this to be true. That park created runs for people who could hit for power...the small dimensions might actuall *HELP* a defense facing players who were hitting it in the yard...less ground to cover. But if you could elevate the ball...you scored more runs.

The stat says the park was a strong hitter's park...about +0.5 runs per game per side (that's pretty extreme)...but it also says their HUGE split in 1887 was generated at least in part because they took advantage of their park better than anyone else in the league.

[Ubiquitous]

I'm not disagreeing with you on the problem with hitting for power in 1887...as I said, I agree putting it in play was good back then.

But while that park was a hitter's park, they performed even BETTER there as a team than you would expect them to perform...it was masking a weak offense and making them score at an average rate even after you remove the park effect...that's what I was trying to say...it didn't come out right at all...LOL


Alright now you got me all confused. First you said they were a good offense hampered by a bad defense. Now you are saying that the team was a weak offense and that the park was a good (but not great) hitters park. So which is it?

Do you think it was a good offense with a bad defense or a weak offense helped by its park with a good defense?

Personally I think the 1887 team had a good pitching staff (high K's, decent walk rate, didn't give up the long ball surrounded by a very good fielding staff. Anson was good with the glove, Pfeffer was too and Williamson and Burns. They were called the "stonewall infield" at the time. Williamson was considered one of the best defensive players in hsi day. Pfeffer was the first to pioneer the cut-off man, and Burns was basically there because of his defense.

[SABR Matt]

BTW...minor note...on the defensive stats (defensive park reactions and intrinsic defense) a + means they allowed FEWER runs than average (higher is better...not more runs).

So...while they were scoring 0.7 Runs/Game more than you woudl expect them to score given the overall parks in which they played...they were allowed 0.3 runs per.game fewer than you'd expected given the parks in which they played. IOW...their defense handled the NL better than normal for that park, because the rest of the NL did not adapt to take advantage of their home park like they did...no one else attempted to hit for power there...only they did.

[Ubiquitous]

but that 1887 team was a solid offense...disguised by a non-favorable field for hitting. 5th of 8 is a bit deceiving here.

they were pretty average across the board it appears.

Okay I'm not getting this then. If the field added .7 runs per game then how is that it is a non-favorable field for hitting and that somehow 5th out 8 improves to average when that is factored in? Wouldn't they either remain 5th or slip further down?

[Ubiquitous]

IOW...their defense handled the NL better than normal for that park, because the rest of the NL did not adapt to take advantage of their home park like they did...no one else attempted to hit for power there...only they did.

So again then the 1887 White Stockings problem was not defense?

[SABR Matt]

Alright now you got me all confused. First you said they were a good offense hampered by a bad defense. Now you are saying that the team was a weak offense and that the park was a good (but not great) hitters park. So which is it?

Do you think it was a good offense with a bad defense or a weak offense helped by its park with a good defense?

Personally I think the 1887 team had a good pitching staff (high K's, decent walk rate, didn't give up the long ball surrounded by a very good fielding staff. Anson was good with the glove, Pfeffer was too and Williamson and Burns. They were called the "stonewall infield" at the time. Williamson was considered one of the best defensive players in hsi day. Pfeffer was the first to pioneer the cut-off man, and Burns was basically there because of his defense.

What I was attempting to say originally (and it came out completely wrong), was that they were an above average offense in production only...and it was caused by their unique reaction to their home park. The reason they scored an average number of runs despite being a pretty "blah" offensive team was because they reacted better to their home park than the rest of the league reacted when they played there. It was a good hitter's park, but it was NOT as extreme as their home split would make it appear.

And I agree with you that their defense was pretty good (I judged too quickly looking at RA totals in my first post and corrected myself when I pulled up the statistics and looked more specifically...I was explaining why they didn't win more games by saying they allowed almost as many as they scored...) FSIA confirms they were a good defensive team...

My main point that I was trying to get accross was that they hit for more power and sacrificed balls in play FOR A REASON...they did it because they knew that their home park was a better park for hitting for power than any other park in the league...because putting the ball in play would probably not be as productive for a team of generally unskilled hitters as poking over the short walls. The fact that they mastered this technique is what made them into a decent offense on paper.

[SABR Matt]

Okay I'm not getting this then. If the field added .7 runs per game then how is that it is a non-favorable field for hitting and that somehow 5th out 8 improves to average when that is factored in? Wouldn't they either remain 5th or slip further down?

OK...let's clear this up.

The FIELD added 0.555 runs per game.

They then added +.7 runs per game ALL ON THEIR OWN...by taking advantage of the field. It's my position that the intrinsic park effect is independent of the team's reaction to that park.

BTW that +.555 for park is ALL of the parks in which they played averaged (weighted averaged) together. Over the course of the entire season...both home and road...the total average park in which they played added +.555 R/G to both sides.

The +0.7 was added by the players...not the park. Specifically to the players' ability to take advantage of the parks in which they played. In this case it's pretty clear that they were taking advantage of their HOME park (by hitting for power when no one else did)...that's an offensive SKILL...not some artifact of the park. The park...facing average hitters of the NL allowed +.555 R/G more than normal. Facing the 1887 Cubs...it allowed those...and then another .7 R/G because the players adopted to the park adn took advantage of it more than the rest of the NL.

[SABR Matt]

Reminder to refresh everyone's memory.

The FSIA models things this way:

RS = (Alltime RS/G + Intrinsic RS Above Average + Net Intrinsic Park Adjustment + Net Intrinsic League Adjustment + Players' Unique offensive reactions to the parks) * Games

RA = (Alltime RS/G - Intrinsic Runs Prevented Above Average + Net Intrinsic Park Adjustment + Net Intrinsic League Average - Players' Unqieu defensive park reactions) * Games

The park reactions are not something created by the field. They are the difference between how the players did and how we'd expect them to do given the other intrinsic conditions, the strength of schedule they faced, and their intrinsic skill. What the FSIA is saying is that the Cubs of '87 were an average offensive team because although they weren't that intrinsically skilled, they got way more out of the parks in which they played than you would expect (mostly their home park with that HUGE split)...and meanwhile...they were a good defense that got even better because they pitched AWAY from power and the league didn't adapt to their home park the way they did.

[digglahhh]

I get what you're saying Matt. I think that this idea is a step forward, at least from my cursory look at your last few posts.

So, there are two factors at play. One is whether a park is an overall hitter or pitcher park- on average.

The other reflects a team's ability to exploit a park beyond what is the average effect. This example and the reasoning involved makes sense, and is consistent with the character of the ballpark.

Now this may be a case where you wouldn't penalize splits too much, because it seems clear that this team figured out how to exploit their park. The produce at a rate that is beyond the neutral park adjustment. Perhaps, that is the beginning of a good guideline to use when we consider whether or not great hitters should get credit for exploiting the advantages they are privy to.

How much more did Boggs benefit from the wall, than Joe Red Sock?


Oh and Matt, about the Tigers- the league average was .261, Fielder hit that on the nose and Tettleton hit .263. My point was A) Deer and Invaglia were the only guys on that team with more than 200 ABs who hit below the TEAM average, that indicates some skewing going on. B) They didn't have even one .300 hitter to balance out the dead weight that was Rob and Pete.

In other words they're team averages didn't represent a bell curve at all. The had nobody, probably, who was more than one standard devation above the league average and two guys who were probably, two SDs below it. Now, I don't know the actual SD data, that was a guess. But just plotting the team averages on a curve in my head, I can see that those two players did horrible damage to the team BA and the team had nobody to counteract their dead weight in the BA department.

[SABR Matt]

I get what you're saying Matt. I think that this idea is a step forward, at least from my cursory look at your last few posts.

So, there are two factors at play. One is whether a park is an overall hitter or pitcher park- on average.

The other reflects a team's ability to exploit a park beyond what is the average effect. This example and the reasoning involved makes sense, and is consistent with the character of the ballpark.

Now this may be a case where you wouldn't penalize splits too much, because it seems clear that this team figured out how to exploit their park. The produce at a rate that is beyond the neutral park adjustment. Perhaps, that is the beginning of a good guideline to use when we consider whether or not great hitters should get credit for exploiting the advantages they are privy to.

How much more did Boggs benefit from the wall, than Joe Red Sock?


Oh and Matt, about the Tigers- the league average was .261, Fielder hit that on the nose and Tettleton hit .263. My point was A) Deer and Invaglia were the only guys on that team with more than 200 ABs who hit below the TEAM average, that indicates some skewing going on. B) They didn't have even one .300 hitter to balance out the dead weight that was Rob and Pete.

In other words they're team averages didn't represent a bell curve at all. The had nobody, probably, who was more than one standard devation above the league average and two guys who were probably, two SDs below it. Now, I don't know the actual SD data, that was a guess. But just plotting the team averages on a curve in my head, I can see that those two players did horrible damage to the team BA and the team had nobody to counteract their dead weight in the BA department.

I knew what you meant...I was just saying the Tigers weren't a "good" contact hitting team even if you remove Inky and Deer. They were about league average. I think you need to be at least roughly within a few points of league average as a contact hitting team to score, mainly because it's physically impossible to be a team with nothing but great power hitters that draw lots of walks (good selective eye for the zone) and yet arent' good enough hiters to make contact enough to stay alive.

Dave Kingman, Rob Deer, George Bell...these types of players are exceedingly rare...players good enough to cripple mistakes and who have good strikezone judgment, but can't hit for contact at all. Whole teams of these guys are even more rare...so offensively successful teams generally live, minimally somewhere near average in that contact skill.

[RuthMayBond]

Dave Kingman, Rob Deer, George Bell...these types of players are exceedingly rare...players good enough to cripple mistakes and who have good strikezone judgment.Um, if "good strikezone judgment" includes Kingman leading the league in K three times and a 3/1 K/BB, Deer leading the league in K four times. George Bell's "can't hit for contact at all" hit .278 in a .263 league.

[SABR Matt]

Oh...as for your comments about park data...

Let's see here...Wade Boggs' career:
Age Yr OWC PA
24 1982 4.80 381
25 1983 12.81 685
26 1984 7.79 726
27 1985 12.40 758
28 1986 13.97 693
29 1987 16.18 667
30 1988 11.95 719
31 1989 9.22 742
32 1990 6.71 713
33 1991 7.53 641
34 1992 3.37 598
35 1993 5.39 644
36 1994 7.16 434
37 1995 5.69 541
38 1996 4.61 574
39 1997 3.33 407
40 1998 1.91 483
41 1999 2.06 334

That's the PCA v1 analysis of him using standard park factors to handicap his offense.

I believe these win figures will go UP on a second analysis of Boggs when this new FSIA data in encorporated...and here's why.

In that time, Fenway Park looks lik this by the FSIA:
Year HomePk NetPk O-React
1982 0.500 0.230 0.244
1983 0.101 0.045 -0.028
1984 0.566 0.257 0.152
1985 0.114 0.055 0.032
1986 -0.043 -0.020 -0.053
1987 0.005 0.014 0.189
1988 0.469 0.210 0.264
1989 0.272 0.117 0.143
1990 0.202 0.087 0.292
1991 0.222 0.106 0.006
1992 0.214 0.096 0.052
1993 0.420 0.199 0.142
1994 0.311 0.159 -0.199
1995 0.034 0.030 -0.154

Let me clarify meanings here.

HomePk -> The intrinsic park factor for Fenway Park in terms of Runs/Game/Side added.

NetPk -> The weighted average park effect in terms of runs/game/side for all of the parks in which the Red Sox played.

O-React -> The offensive reactions by the Red Sox to the parks in which they played (again, where park reactions represent success or failure beyond what is expected based on the intrinsic league and park effects, the strength of the defenses faced by the Sox and their own offensive intrinsic strength.

Fenway has a net bias toward being a hitter's park, though the actual MAGNITUDE of this hitter friendliness appears somewhat exaggerated by traditional park factoring. And the reason it appears exaggerated is that the Sox have *historically* been good at exploiting Fenway park.

I don't have access to W-L or RS/RA game-logs in digital forms at the moment, but if you go back through time, the Sox have generally had a larger homefield advantage than normal. They tend to scout specifically for players who they know will be able to bang balls off the monster when they go looking for hitters to add. Wade Boggs is a classic example of this.

As is Carl Yastrzemski.

I commonly see folks in the history forum post Red Sox home/road split data for key players and use that as concrete evidence that those players should be heavily penalized in the rankings because their home park is helping them. And while it's clear that the Sox' home park is hitter friendly on the whole...at the seasonal level we're talking about a net park effect of something like 0.15 R/G/S Fenway...and the rest of the parks averaged in...are probably only combining to add something like 16-32 runs to a full season of Red Sox hitting...the Red Sox have historically done the rest.

[Ubiquitous]

Um, if "good strikezone judgment" includes Kingman leading the league in K three times and a 3/1 K/BB, Deer leading the league in K four times. George Bell's "can't hit for contact at all" hit .278 in a .263 league.

I'm guessing they were swinging at strikes. ;)

[SABR Matt]

Um, if "good strikezone judgment" includes Kingman leading the league in K three times and a 3/1 K/BB, Deer leading the league in K four times. George Bell's "can't hit for contact at all" hit .278 in a .263 league.

Kingman had SOME years where he demonstrated the ability to take a walk, but yes, that was a bad choice of player. A better choice would have been Jay Buhner.